Abstract-Recent advances in microelectromechanical system (MEMS) technology have boosted the deployment of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Limited by the energy storage capability of sensor nodes, it is crucial to jointly consider security and energy efficiency in data collection of WSNs. The disjoint multipath routing scheme with secret sharing is widely recognized as one of the effective routing strategies to ensure the safety of information. This kind of scheme transforms each packet into several shares to enhance the security of transmission. However, in many-to-one WSNs, shares have high probability to traverse through the same link and to be intercepted by adversaries. In this paper, we formulate the secret-sharing-based multipath routing problem as an optimization problem. Our objective aims at maximizing both network security and lifetime, subject to the energy constraints. To this end, a three-phase disjoint routing scheme called the Security and Energy-efficient Disjoint Route (SEDR) is proposed. Based on the secret-sharing algorithm, the SEDR scheme dispersively and randomly delivers shares all over the network in the first two phases and then transmits these shares to the sink node. Both theoretical and simulation results demonstrate that our proposed scheme has significant improvement in network security under both scenarios of single and multiple black holes without reducing the network lifetime.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS sensor networks (WSNs) have been widely deployed for an extensive range of applications, such as intelligent transportation, military, and civilian domains [1] - [3] . The characteristics of wireless sensor nodes, such as low cost, simplicity, and broadcast, have further accelerated the deployments of WSNs. To this end, advanced wireless techniques, such as vehicular sensor networks (VSNs), are emerging to collect sensing data and provide them to users. However, these characteristics may also cause some potential safety risks [4] - [6] . Black-hole attack is one of attacks that adversaries may choose to interfere with information delivery. In some cases, adversaries may have mobility to increase the number of black holes for achieving a high packet interception probability. Generally, compromised node (CN) and denial of service (DOS) attacks are two kinds of common black-hole attacks [7] , [8] . In the CN attack, adversaries try to compromise a subset of nodes to passively intercept the packets traversing these nodes. In the DOS attack, adversaries actively disrupt, change, or even paralyze the functionalities of a subset nodes, such that the normal operations of WSNs cannot be executed.
Designing routing strategies to bypass black holes is one of effective methods for addressing such kind of security issues. Previous works mainly aim at delivering packets along disjoint multipath routes, which can be generally summarized as follows: 1) deterministic disjoint multipath routing [2] and 2) randomly disjoint multipath routing [7] . Both routing strategies focus on transmitting copies of packets along the disjoint routes, which are calculated by some multipath routing algorithms. Randomly disjoint multipath routing does not have a fixed candidate route for selection. Therefore, it is able to ensure that adversaries cannot know the routes, even if they obtain the routing algorithms in advance. Some works combine secret sharing and randomly disjoint multipath routing to further enhance the security of WSNs [7] . However, most previous works do not consider the network lifetime of WSNs, which may lead to a high probability of sensor node outage and cause a cessation of normal operations. In this paper, we try to maximize both the network security and lifetime by exploiting an effective randomly disjoint multipath routing scheme with secret sharing.
The main contributions of this paper are three-fold.
1)
We formulate the secret-sharing-based disjoint multipath routing problem as an optimization problem. Our objective is to deliver sliced packet shares along randomly generated disjoint paths by the routing scheme, such that both the network security and lifetime can be maximized. 2) By jointly considering the network security and lifetime, we propose a three-phase routing scheme called security and energy-efficient disjoint route (SEDR). First, packets are sliced into shares by (T, M )-threshold secret-sharing algorithm, and our proposed SEDR scheme disperses these shares in a certain region around the source node. Second, shares are randomly forwarded along identicalhop routes all over the whole network. Finally, the SEDR algorithm transmits shares to the sink node by using leasthop routing. 3) We analyze the security and lifetime performance of WSNs. The packet interception probability of our SEDR scheme is obtained in both single and multiple-black-hole cases, and the minimal required size of the physically secured area is derived. Moreover, our analysis indicates that the network lifetime will not decrease if the radius of the network is not less than four hops. Extensive simulation results match our theoretical ones and demonstrate that the SEDR scheme significantly outperforms existing routing schemes in terms of network security and lifetime under a variety of network scenarios. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we give a broad review of the existing routing strategies. In Section III, we present the system configurations and problem formulation. Our proposed routing scheme called SEDR is introduced in Section IV. In Section V, we analyze the network security and lifetime of the SEDR scheme. Simulation results are presented in Section VI. Finally, we conclude our work in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
To improve network security for WSNs, multipath routing strategies [7] , [9] , [10] have become a hot topic. It can generally be classified into two categories: 1) packet delivery, which directly transmits packets by various paths [10] - [15] , and 2) share delivery, i.e., transforming each packet into shares and then forwarding shares along different routes [16] - [21] . Packet delivery mainly focuses on discovering node-disjoint or edge-disjoint paths for transmission; thus, it can enhance the security and robustness of networks. In [10] , the Split Multiple Routing protocol was proposed to establish two maximally disjoint routes by flooding the ROUTE REQUEST (RREQ) message to the entire network. In [11] , the security of sensor network routing protocols was analyzed, and it was found that multipath routing strategies are one of the effective countermeasure for the selective forwarding attack. In [12] , a Multidataflow Topologies (MDT) method was designed to counter the selective forwarding attack by dividing the sensor nodes into twodataflow topologies. However, packet delivery duplicates the transmissions, which may lead to high energy consumption.
Normally, share delivery uses secret sharing to enhance the security of packet transmission. Based on a secret-sharing algorithm [16] , the adversary cannot decode the packet without intercepting a required number of shares. Therefore, the security performance of the network is improved. Moreover, as there is no need to duplicate packet transmissions, share delivery can significantly relieve the energy consumption of networks. In [17] , based on a distributed N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol and secret sharing, the hybrid multipath scheme (H-SPREAD) was designed to improve both the security and reliability of WSNs. In [22] , a secure message transmission mechanism was proposed to continuously evaluate the performance of each route, and then, routing of subsequent shares is determined according to the rating of routes. These works focus on deterministic multipath routing strategies, i.e., the route computation is not changed under the same topology. With random multipath routing protocols [20] , [21] , [23] , share delivery can further strengthen and guarantee the security of packet transmission, even if adversaries acquire the routing strategy. In [19] , a mathematical framework was presented for analyzing random-routing protocols. The closest past literature to ours is the work in [7] . Four propagation schemes were proposed to dispersively deliver the shares of packets, such that the packet interception probability can be guaranteed. However, most previous works did not consider the network lifetime, which is one of the critical issues in WSNs. In our work, we jointly consider both network security and lifetime issues while aim at designing an efficient secret-sharing-based disjoint multipath routing scheme to enhance both the security and lifetime performance of WSNs.
III. SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a circular region of many-to-one high-density WSNs with sensor nodes uniformly and randomly distributed in it [24] , [25] . As wireless sensor nodes are low-cost wireless devices, it is not reasonable to equip sensor nodes with expensive Global Positioning System (GPS) devices. Thus, GPS-free sensor nodes are used in our work, whereas each sensor only needs to have relative location information of itself and its neighbors, i.e., the least number of hops to the sink node. The relative location information is periodically updated between neighbors to ensure the accuracy [26] . When a sensor node detects an event, it will generate messages and send those messages to the sink node [24] . Link-level security based on a conventional cryptography-based bootstrapping algorithm is assumed, which uses symmetric link keys to encrypt consecutive links along each end-to-end path. Thus, we assume that a link key is safe, except that either side of the link is physically compromised by the adversary [7] , [27] . Due to the simplicity of wireless sensor node, WSNs are vulnerable to a variety of attacks. Generally, the adversary is able to compromise multiple sensor nodes, except the sink and its immediate surrounding nodes, as these nodes can be easily physically secured by installing video monitoring equipment [7] , [22] , [28] . Once the sensor nodes are compromised, adversary can form the black holes to acquire all the information of end-to-end paths traverses through these black holes [7] . To increase the security, we employ the (T, M )-threshold secret-sharing mechanism [29] , i.e., each packet is broken into M shares and can be decoded only when at least T shares are received.
Our energy consumption model is based on the power consumption model in [24] and [30] . The notation is given in Table I . According to the distance between the transmitter and the receiver, the energy spent for transmitting -bit packet over distance d, which is denoted as E t , can be expressed by free space and multipath fading channel models as follows:
where energy loss E c depends on factors such as digital coding and modulation. The energy consumed for receiving this message is E r ( ) = E c .
In this paper, we focus on designing routing protocols to maximize the lifetime of WSNs while guarantee the security TABLE I  TABLE OF NOTATION of the whole network. Thus, our objective function consists of two parts: 1) maximizing network lifetime and 2) minimizing the probability of eavesdropping. Since the outage of sensor nodes may have significant impacts on network coverage and communications, we denote the network lifetime Γ as the period from the start of network operation until the first power outage occurs in WSNs [24] , [31] , [32] . Let E i denote the energy consumption of node i. The objective of maximizing network lifetime can be expressed as
Security level is determined by the probability that black holes can decode the packet, i.e., black holes intercept at least T shares when M shares of an information packet are sent from the source sensor node. Thus, the security is the probability that at least T shares traverse through the black hole in a total of M shares [7] , [29] . Suppose that each black hole i occupies a region N i and can intercept all the transmitted packets within this region. As black holes may have some overlapping regions, the total area of black holes should be N ≤ k n=1 (N i ). Let i stand for the total area that the ith share T i can forward the packet. The probability that share T i is eavesdropped can be expressed as q i = N / i . Since each share has the same probability to be intercepted, we have q = q i = q j , i, j ∈ {1 . . . M}. Therefore, the probability that the adversary can acquire at least T shares is
Combining maximizing network lifetime and minimizing the probability of eavesdropping, our objective function can be formulated as follows:
IV. SECURITY AND ENERGY-EFFICIENT DISJOINT ROUTE SCHEME
In this section, we propose the SEDR scheme to maximize both the network lifetime and the security. Specifically, SEDR focuses on increasing security by utilizing available energy to forward shares with disjoint routes. We first give an overview of the SEDR scheme in Section IV-A, followed by the detailed description in Section IV-B. Finally, we introduce the energy consumption analysis in Section IV-C. 
A. Scheme Overview
As the typical many-to-one traffic pattern leads to uneven energy consumption, the sensor nodes close to the sink node have much higher chances of power outage. When one of the sensor nodes is out of energy in WSNs, the nodes far away from the sink node normally have only used 10% of their batteries [24] , [30] . Thus, our proposed scheme aims at utilizing the redundant energy to dispersively distribute the shares of packets all over the WSNs and then forward these shares to the sink node along the randomized disjoint routes. The scheme enhances the network security by increasing the diversity of disjoint routes, which significantly decreases the probability of packet interception by adversaries. In the meantime, the least required number of shares M is reduced with the improvement of security, which leads to energy savings.
Our SEDR scheme is composed of three phases: 1) regional dispersive routing; 2) disjoint identical-hop routing; and 3) least-hop routing. Based on the (T, M )-threshold secretsharing mechanism, such as the Shamir's algorithm [29] , to break the packet into M shares, the M shares are sent to M randomly selected sensor nodes in the regional dispersive routing phase. In the disjoint identical-hop routing phase, M shares are transmitted to other sensor nodes that are dispersively distributed in the network with disjoint routes, where all the sensor nodes along the same routing path have equal hops to the sink node. Finally, the SEDR scheme uses the shortest routing path to forward the M shares to the sink node. An example is shown in Fig. 1 . Source node s breaks the packet into six shares and sends them to the randomly selected sensor nodes around the source node, i.e., regional dispersive relay nodes; then, these shares are further forwarded to the sensor nodes randomly selected from the whole network, which are called identical-hop relay nodes, in the disjoint identical-hop routing phase. Finally, M shares are transmitted with the shortest routing path to the sink node. Our analysis shows the probability that the adversary can decode that the packet is close to 0 when there exists one black hole in the WSNs. Even when multiple black holes are in the network, the probability that T shares are intercepted by the adversaries is very low as the area of the black hole is tiny, compared with the area of whole WSNs. The redundant energy is utilized to forward the shares of packets along disjoint routes in the whole network, which does not have an impact on decreasing the network lifetime. Moreover, with the improvement of network security, the network lifetime is extended as the least required number of shares M is reduced. The details of network security and lifetime analysis are presented in Section V.
B. SEDR Scheme
The SEDR scheme tries to increase the diversity of routing paths by forwarding the shares to the sensor nodes dispersively distributed all over the network with disjoint routes. Thus, the regional dispersive routing and disjoint identical-hop routing phases aim at randomly distributing the shares in the whole network and then transmit the shares to the sink node by leasthop routing.
We define the line from the source node to the sink node as the X-axis and the line orthogonal to the X-axis at the source node as the Y -axis. By considering the X-axis as the polar axis, we construct an analogous polar system with the sink node as pole and γ as the hop coordinate, where γ is the hop length from the polar axis along the route consisting of the sensor nodes that have identical hop length to the sink node. The illustration is shown in Fig. 2 . Let h denote the hop length from the source node to the sink node and −τ max ∼ τ max denote the width and height of the region along the X-axis and the Y -axis. For the regional dispersive phase, we aim at evenly distributing shares in region [h − τ max , h + τ max ]. Initially, each packet is broken into M shares. Each share has a set of information (ID, X h , Y h , γ h ), where the ID is used to identify each share.
(X h , Y h ) and γ h are the randomly generated hop lengths to forward the shares in regional dispersive routing and disjoint identical-hop routing phases, respectively. X h and Y h are the hops that the shares should be forwarded along the X-and Y -axes, which are randomly obtained from {−τ max , τ max }. Then, each share is transmitted hop by hop until reaching the determined locations. The hop lengths from the sink node to these shares are randomly distributed in [h − τ max , h + τ max ]. Let γ h denote the hops of γ that the share should forward from its regional dispersive relay nodes. Similar to regional dispersive routing, each share randomly obtains γ h from {−γ max , γ max } and is transmitted hop by hop until achieving its identical-hop relay node in disjoint identical-hop routing phase, where γ max is the maximum γ of each share. Finally, the shares are sent to the sink node according to the routes with the least of hop length. The details of the SEDR scheme can be found in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 SEDR scheme
Break packets by (T, M )-threshold secret sharing; for all Data share 
C. Energy Consumption Analysis
In the SEDR scheme, we focus on transmitting the shares of packets along the routes distributed in the whole network to enhance the security of the network. Intuitively, the diversity of routes is proportional to the network security. However, the energy consumption of sensor nodes may increase at the same time, which may also lead to a decrease in network lifetime. To simplify the analysis of the relationship between network security and lifetime, the impact of different parameters, such as energy consumption and distance from the sink node to the sensors, on network lifetime is illustrated in this section.
As the energy consumption of sensor nodes is uneven caused by the many-to-one traffic pattern, we analyze the relationship between sensor nodes' energy consumption and locations in each phase. The packet slicing is operated by CPU, and all the sensor nodes are fairly treated in the regional dispersive routing phase. Thus, the energy consumption of sensor nodes is not related to the sensor nodes' positions in these two operations. In the shortest path routing, sensor nodes close to the sink node aggregates the traffic of nodes far away from the sink node; thus, the insider sensor nodes consume more energy, compared with the outsider nodes. Thus, we analyze the energy consumption in the least-hop routing phase to determine the available volume of redundant energy for the hop length of share transmission in the disjoint identical-hop routing phase. Let R denote the radius of the network, r the transmission range, and λ the probability that packet transmission occurs. The energy consumption of each node can be obtained by the number of traffic transmissions, i.e., the number of transmitted shares.
Theorem 1: Let the distance from a sensor node to the sink node be l, l = (h − 1)r + x, where x is the distance smaller than the distance of one hop. The number of transmitted shares relayed by this sensor node with the least-hop routing, which is denoted as d l , is
where z is any integer that can keep l + zr < R. Proof: As shown in Fig. 2 , node n x is located at a district surrounded by sector radii and arcs, which consists of sensor nodes with identical hop length to the sink node. Let θ denote the angle of this sector and d x denote the height of this district. With the least-hop routing, the nodes in the district relay all the traffic for the nodes with l + r, l + 2r, . . . , l + zr from the sink node in the sector. As we consider a large-scale high-density network, the length of d x is infinitesimal and negligible. We can express the area of the district θld x and the number of the nodes in the district ρθld x . Thus, the number of shares transferred by the district is θρld x λ. The number of shares relayed by districts with l + r, l + 2r, . . . l + zr from the sink node in the sector can be deduced by analogy, which is θρ(l + zr)d x λ. Based on the number of transmitted shares in this sector, we can obtain the number of transmitted shares relayed by sensor node n x with the least-hop routing
Reorganizing (6), the expression of d l can be simplified as (5) .
As the network lifetime depends on the first outage of sensor nodes, it is determined by the sensor node with the maximum energy consumption. Let d max denote the transmitted number of shares by the node with the maximum energy consumption and e u the energy consumption for a share. The remaining energy for each sensor node is (d max − d l )e u , which can be used for forwarding (d max − d l )e u /e u hops along identical hop. Thus, the hop length that can be forwarded along identicalhop routes is exactly d max − d l . out reducing the network lifetime. As each share can be forwarded along the identical-hop route by two directions, the maximal length of routing path is half of the identical-hop circumference centered by the sink node, i.e., πl, and the maximal hop length along the identical-hop route is πl/r. Thus, the maximal hop length for a sensor node to forward along the identical-hop route is min{(
We define the whole-network dispersive routing to ensure that the disjoint identical-hop routing phase can be realized if the whole-network dispersive routing can be guaranteed. Whole-network dispersive routing is defined as the regional dispersive relay nodes randomly forwarding the shares along the identical-hop routes all over the whole network without reducing the network lifetime. We derive the scale of the network for supporting whole-network dispersive routing.
Theorem 3: To support whole-network dispersive routing, we need to ensure that the least hop length of the WSNs' radius should be
, where z is integer. (7) Proof: Intuitively, the redundant energy can support whole-network dispersive routing if it is enough to forward shares along the identical-hop route by πlλ/r hops. As all the shares are relayed by the neighbors of sink node, the difference between the energy of the sink node's neighbors and other sensor nodes is the available energy. When h = 0, the available energy can support (z + 1 + (z(1 + z)r/2x))λ shares; When h > 1, the available energy can support (z + 1 + (z(1 + z)r/2(h − 1)r + x))λ shares. The number of shares that the remaining energy can support is denoted as ψ, which is
The expression can be reorganized as
To guarantee the whole-network dispersive routing, we should ensure that the expectation of the available energy can be sufficient to forward shares by πlλ/r < πh hops, where the expectation of the available energy is [z(1 + z)](h − 1)λ/h. Then, we can further derive the exact value of integer z
where z is integer. (10) Lemma 1: When the radius of WSNs is larger or equal to four hops, the whole-network dispersive routing does not reduce the network lifetime.
Proof: Based on Theorem 3, there will be enough redundant energy to support the whole-network dispersive routing, when the network radius is not less than 4. As the network lifetime depends on the sensor node with maximal energy consumption, the network lifetime is not decreased when there is enough redundant energy. 
V. ANALYSIS OF NETWORK SECURITY AND LIFETIME
In this section, we analyze the network security and lifetime of the SEDR scheme. First, the single-black-hole case is considered, and the packet interception probability for a single black hole is obtained in Section V-A. Then, we study the security performance of multiple black holes in Section V-B. Finally, the relationship between network lifetime and network security requirement is derived in Section V-C. Fig. 3 shows a single-black-hole system. d s and d b are denoted as the distance from source node S, and CN A to sink node O, respectively. The CN usually pretends as a normal sensor node by black-hole attack; thus, it has the same capability as an ordinary sensor node, e.g., the transmission/attack range. Moreover, our analysis also considers the cases that the CNs and ordinary sensor nodes have different capabilities [7] , [25] .
A. Security Analysis for Single Black Hole
For one-hop forwarding, let α denote the angle between the source-sink line and the destination-sink line, and ϕ is the angle that the packets are captured by the black hole, as shown in Fig. 3 .
Theorem 4: To ensure that the black hole cannot intercept T shares when the source node has sent M shares, the forwarding hop length, which is denoted as ζ, should hold the following inequality in the disjoint identical-hop routing phase:
Proof: For each hop, the angle α = arccos[(2d
according to the law of cosines. After ζ hops in disjoint identical-hop routing, the angle becomes ζ · α. As proofed in [7] , the worst case occurs when the center of black A, source node S, and sink node O lie on the same line. We consider this the worst case and assume that all the routes traversing through the black hole can be intercepted. Thus, all the routes within angle ϕ = arcsin(r/d b ) can be captured by adversary, and the number of shares is (M · ϕ/ζ · α). To ensure the security of packet transmission, the intercepted number of shares should be less than T , which is (M · ϕ/ζ · α) < T . Then, we can obtain the inequality of hop length ζ in disjoint identical-hop routing to guarantee the security in (11) .
As the area around the sink node is physically secured by the video monitoring equipment, sensor nodes located in the circular area r s centered at the sink node cannot be compromised. The cost and complexity of constructing video monitoring equipment highly depend on the size of the safe area r s .
Theorem 5: When there is sufficient energy to operate whole-network dispersive routing, i.e., z ≥ 4, the size of area r s should fulfill the following inequality to guarantee the security:
Proof: When the available energy can support wholenetwork dispersive routing, we have ζ ≤ (d s · π/r). Based on Theorem 4, the following inequality holds:
Then, we can get (12) by reorganizing (13) . Theorem 6: The probability that each share may be intercepted by black hole is
Proof: When the forwarded hop length of shares is ζ, ϕ = arcsin(r/d b ), and α = arccos[(2d
Based on Theorem 5, the probability is the occupied angle of the black hole over the angle of forwarded hop length, i.e., φ 1 = (ϕ/ζα).
Theorem 7:
The packet interception probability of the SEDR scheme under the scenario of a single black hole, which is denoted as P 1 , is
where ϕ = arcsin (r/d b ) .
(15)
Proof: As the SEDR scheme adopts the whole-network dispersive routing, shares are randomly and uniformly forwarded over the whole network. Thus, the probability that the black hole can intercept each share only depends on the occupied angle by the black hole in the whole network, which is ϕ/π. For the case that T shares are intercepted by the black hole, the probability is
Thus, the probability of packet interception by the black hole is
Reorganizing (17), we can obtain (15) .
Theorem 6 indicates the packet interception probability for each share. To correctly decode the transmitted packet, the sink node requires at least T shares.
Lemma 2: To ensure that at least T shares are not intercepted by the black hole, the least required number of transmitted shares M should be
Proof: According to Theorem 6, the packet interception probability is φ 1 = (ϕ/ζα). Thus, the least required number of transmitted shares M should be
On the other hand, to prevent adversary decoding of the packet, the number of received shares by black hole should be less than T .
Lemma 3: To guarantee the number of intercepted shares by black hole to be less than T , the number of transmitted shares M should be
Proof: Based on Theorem 6, the packet interception probability is φ 1 = (ϕ/ζα). Thus, the probability that T shares are intercepted by the black hole is Mφ 1 . To ensure that the number of eavesdropped shares is less than T , we should guarantee
From Lemmas 2 and 3, the security of packet can be guaranteed only when at least T shares are received by the sink node and less than T shares are intercepted by the black hole.
Definition: For each packet, if and only if the sink node can receive at least T shares and less than T shares are intercepted by the black hole can the bi-security of the packet be guaranteed.
Intuitively, the packet can be successfully decoded by the sink node without being acquired by the adversary if and only if the bi-security of the packet can be guaranteed.
Lemma 4: To ensure the security of a packet
Proof: According to Lemmas 2 and 3, to ensure the bisecurity of a packet, we have φ Based on the definition of the bi-security of a packet, we derive the minimal size of the physically secured area as follows:
Theorem 8: To ensure the bi-security of a packet, the minimal physically secured area under the bi-security requirement of the SEDR scheme, which is denoted as r * s , should ensure
Proof: According to Lemma 4, we have
By substituting ζ = (d s π/r) and r * s into (22), we can obtain (21) .
Similarly, we can obtain the minimal physically secured area under the bi-security requirement of I-walk, i.e., r
where R is the radius of the WSNs.
Lemma 5:
The cost of constructing the physically secured area of the SEDR scheme never exceeds the cost of I-walk's.
Proof: Since d s π/r is not less than ζ and α = arccos[(2d
s . Therefore, the cost of constructing the physically secured area of the SEDR scheme is at most the same as that of I-walk.
B. Security Analysis for Multiple Black Holes
As we consider large-scale high-density WSNs, there may exist several black holes in the network at the same time. Based on the results in Section V-A, we further analyze the security performance under the scenario of multiple black holes. We assume that the adversaries always choose the best position to establish black holes, i.e., the center of the black holes, identical-hop relay node, and sink node are on the same line. The parameters defined in the scenario of multiple black holes are the same as those in the single-black-hole case. Suppose that there are k black holes in the network and all black holes have the same size.
Theorem 9: The probability for each share to traverse through black holes under the scenario of k black holes is
Proof: From Theorem 4, the occupied angle of one black hole is 2ϕ. Thus, for k black holes, the maximal occupied angle is 2kϕ. Then, we can obtain the probability for each share to traverse through black holes as P k = min(2kϕ/2ζα, 1), which is (24) .
Based on Theorem 9, we can derive the packet interception probability of the adversaries under the scenario of k black holes.
Lemma 6: The probability that the packet can be successfully decoded by the adversaries is
Proof: For k black holes, the maximal occupied angle in the whole network is min (2kϕ, 2π) . If the total occupied angle is not less than 2π, all the shares will be received by the adversaries; thus, the packet interception probability P k is 1.
Otherwise, the occupied angle is 2kϕ, and the probability that at least T shares are intercepted by the adversaries is
Combining both cases, we have (26) . We have obtained the probability that the adversaries can successfully acquire the transmitted packet for the case that the adversaries always compromise the nodes located in the best position. We further derive the packet interception probability for the case that black holes are randomly distributed in the whole network.
Theorem 10: Suppose that k black holes are uniformly and randomly distributed in the network region with radius R. If black holes do not overlap with each other, the packet interception probability, which is denoted as P
Proof: First, we consider the case where there is only one black hole in the network and the probability density function that the black hole located at the position that is x far away from the sink node can be expressed as
Thus, the packet interception probability for the case of a single randomly distributed black hole P u 1 is
Similar to previous derivation, we can obtain the packet interception probability that at least T packets are intercepted when k nonoverlapping black holes are established.
C. Network Lifetime Analysis
In this section, we consider the scenario that there are k black holes. The adversaries can always choose the best position to establish black holes, i.e., the center of the black holes, identical-hop relay node, and sink node are on the same line. We analyze the impact of packet interception probability on network lifetime and try to establish the relationship between packet interception probability and network lifetime.
Theorem 11: For the same WSNs and routing strategy, let the packet interception probability be P k (x 1 ) and P k (x 2 ), and let P k (x 1 ) < P k (x 2 ). The ratio of network lifetime to achieve the same security requirement in these two cases is
Proof: According to Theorem 3, the least required number of shares M should exceed (T /1 − P k ) . As the initial network energy of sensor nodes and the routing strategy are the same, the ratio of the network lifetime to guarantee the same network security level is equal to the inverse of the ratio of the least required number of shares, which is ( Fig. 4 . Impact of source-sink distance on packet interception probability. 
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
Our simulation is conducted by OMNET++, which is an open network simulation platform for large networks [33] . Our WSNs are a circular region with radius 400 m, which consists of 800 sensor nodes evenly distributed in the network. The traffic is randomly and evenly generated for each node. Detail of simulation configurations is shown in Table II . We study the impact of source-sink distance d s , the distance between CN and sink node d b , the spreading hop length ζ, and the number of black holes in Figs. 4-7, respectively. Fig. 4 Fig . 6 . Impact of forwarded hop length on packet interception probability. Fig. 7 . Impact of black holes' number on packet interception probability.
shows the black hole interception probability with different source-sink distances when the distance between the sink node and the black hole is fixed at 50 m. For I-walk routing, the packet interception probability increases with the increase in source-sink distance. For the SEDR scheme, the packet interception probability can be determined by angle ϕ without being changed by the source-sink distance d s since shares are routed all over the network. Figs. 5 and 6 show the packet interception probability with different locations of black hole and the spreading hop length ζ, respectively. Obviously, when the black hole's location is far away from sink or shares are spread far away from the source node, the probability of packet interception is decreased, which leads to better performance of security. We further evaluate the security performance of SEDR against I-walk under multiple black holes, as shown in Fig. 7 . We can see that our SEDR scheme has lower packet interception probability and the simulation results are consistent with theoretical results. Overall, these figures show the following: 1) The simulation results match our theoretical analysis, and 2) the SEDR scheme significantly outperforms the I-walk with different parameters in security. Fig. 8 . Impact of transmission range on the total energy consumption. Table III shows that the least required number of shares M needed to be transmitted under the case that at least T = 4 shares are received by the sink node to decode the packet. It is found that the least required number of shares M climbs with the increase in d s . Since the outage of network highly depends on the number of shares M , our simulations are conducted to evaluate the total energy consumption and network lifetime of the proposed SEDR scheme with various transmission range r in Figs. 8 and 9 , respectively. It can be seen from Fig. 8 that, when transmission range r is relatively small, I-walk consumes more energy than the SEDR due to more transmission of shares; when transmission range r is relatively large, the proposed SEDR has higher energy consumption, compared with I-walk, due to utilizing the redundant energy to forward the shares. Fig. 9 shows the network lifetime for rounds of packet transmissions with different values of r. The SEDR always outperforms I-walk with the same security requirement since the shares transmitted by the SEDR have lower probability to be intercepted by the adversary, which leads to a lower required number of shares M and releases the burden of the sensor node with maximal energy consumption.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the problem of secret-sharingbased multipath routing and formulated it as an optimization problem to maximize both the network security and lifetime. Based on the secret-sharing technique, the SEDR scheme has been proposed to deliver sliced shares to the sink node with randomized disjoint multipath routes by utilizing the available surplus energy of sensor nodes, such that the network security is maximized without decreasing the lifetime of WSNs. Theoretical analysis and extensive simulation results show that the SEDR scheme outperforms I-walk in both network security and lifetime under various parameters. In our future work, we will design an energy-efficient and secure routing scheme for WSNs, considering both packet loss and delay due to the fading channel.
